communication technologies for empowerment ' (200) . For Mary Flanagan and Austin Booth it is '[g]rounded in both practice and theory . . . a new wave of feminist theory and practice that is united in challenging the "coding" of technology and in investigating the complex relationships between gender and digital culture ' (11) . The semantic shifts between these definitions do not just suggest the loose parameters of a new study, they indicate that cyberfeminism is unsure of its theoretical territory. Thus cyberfeminism is hampered by a lack of rigorous definition, something which, as will be shown, is aggravated by -and aggravates -its lack of political and historical agency. Donna Haraway's 'A Cyborg Manifesto,' a chapter in her Simians, Cyborgs and Women, is an ur-text for cyberfeminism, with its promise of an evolutionary move away from the reification of the patriarchal hegemony.
1 Her cyborg feminism -which must be distinguished from current models of cyberfeminism -is an 'ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism and materialism ' (291) .
2 Yet in this global 'techno-patriarchy' (Klein 210 ) that is the early twenty-first century, the figure of the cyborg works in the service of the reproduction of sex and gender ontologies. Undertaking an analysis of the uncritically bound components of cyberfeminism -which include, but are not limited to, cyborg theory and feminism -this chapter takes its inspiration from Rosi Braidotti's argument that 'it would be more beneficial to all concerned if the tensions that are built into the end-of-century crisis of values were allowed to explode inside feminism, bringing its paradoxes to a fore ' (210) . 3 Exploring the ramifications of cyberfeminism will demonstrate that -like third wave feminism -ownership of the 'brand' is contentious.
Future cunt
We are the modern cunt positive anti reason . . . . we are the virus of the new world disorder rupturing the symbolic from within saboteurs of big daddy mainframe the clitoris is a direct line to the matrix . . . . infiltrating disrupting disseminating corrupting the discourse we are the future cunt (VNS Matrix) 4 One of the differences between the second and third waves of feminism has been the need to negotiate and engage with the new technologies that have emerged since the personal computing revolution of the early 1980s. Cybernetic developments have not merely enabled more immediate communication between disparate groups; rather, they have prefigured new ways of thinking through the Enlightenment body and, as such, intersect with the feminist project. Ednie Kaeh Garrison coined the term 'technologic' to refer to a particular practice of communicating information over space and time, a creation of temporary "unified" political groups made up of unlikely combinations and collectivities . . . the combining of diverse technologies to construct powerful cultural expressions of oppositional consciousness . . . and the construction of feminists' politics of location. (150) Garrison goes on to point up the revolutionary potential of the Internet for bringing together (sub)cultural groups such as the Riot Grrrls. Likewise Scarlet Pollock and Jo Sutton identify the Internet as an extension of the modes of networking supposedly common to the feminist community: '[d] ialogue, encouraging others, listening, sharing, dealing with conflict are all brought into play' (33); and Dale Spender argues that 'the medium is more attuned to women's way of working in the world than to men's . . . [and] has the capacity to create community; to provide untold opportunities for communication, exchange, and keeping in touch' (229). Yet, while the Internet appears to offer the opportunity for transparency and dialogue for both third wave feminists and cyberfeminists, few are willing to examine under what conditions this transparency and dialogue take place.
Alison Adam claims that the apolitical nature of cyberfeminism is evidenced in the way in which it avoids ethical questions, just as third wave feminism is excoriated by 'real' feminists for its apparent inability to politicise women ('Ethical' 168) . Without a political analysis reflection on material conditionsand ultimately self-knowledge -becomes impossible. Self-professed cyberfeminist Faith Wilding conflates cyberfeminism and postfeminism, defining cyberfeminism as 'a promising new wave of (post)feminist thinking and practice. Through the work of numerous Netactive women, there is now a distinct cyberfeminist Netpresence that is fresh, brash, smart and iconoclastic of many of the tenets of classical feminism' (Wilding and the Critical Art Ensemble par. 1).
5 One could easily exchange 'third wave' for 'cyberfeminist' here. Despite Maria Fernandez and Faith Wilding recently noting that cyberfeminism makes little mention of 'the crucially different conditions -be they economic, cultural, racial or ethnic, geographic, or environmental -under which women worldwide experience sexuality and pleasure, aging, menopause, motherhood, child rearing, ecology and the environment' (21) this is still a cyberfeminism that is predicated on women's use of technology. A careful distinction needs to be made -just as there are those who engage with third wave feminism but who would not profess to be third wave feminists, there are those women (and men) who engage in gender and technology studies who would not profess to be cyberfeminists.
Cyberfeminism claims Donna Haraway and Sadie Plant as its 'mothers,' drawing upon the feminist strategy of 'leaders' and 'waves.' 6 There are, however, substantial theoretical differences between these two 'mothers. ' Haraway positions the image of the cyborg as breaking down the binary oppositions of meat/metal and consequently allowing for the possibility of post-gender. The cyborg, for Haraway, is a 'myth about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities' (154). Sadie Plant, on the other hand, takes an essentialist position and points up women's supposed affinity with the new 'freedoms' of cyberspace.
The Internet promises women a network of lines on which to chatter, natter, work and play; virtuality brings a fluidity to identities which once had to be fixed; and multi-media provides a tactile environment in which women artists can find their space. . . . Women are accessing the circuits on which they were once exchanged, hacking into security's controls, and discovering their own post-humanity. (265) Dissent from those two models -the post-gender cyborg and the cybergoddess -has not been readily forthcoming because Haraway and Plant thus validate (any and all) activity by women online. This is 'Internet' as metaphor, not a materialist examination of the Internet. The result of 'all' woman-centred online activity being authenticated is an apolitical and dehistoricised cyberfeminist consciousness which, as Judith Squires puts it, 'has become the distorted fantasy of those so cynical of traditional political strategies, so bemused by the complexity of social materiality, and so bound up in the rhetoric of the space flows of information technology, that they have forgotten both the exploitative and alienating potential of technology' (369). This is not to argue that there are not fruitful debates taking place concerning the gendered nature of information technology; rather, what is being disputed is the branding of these debates as cyberfeminist. Cyberfeminismseduced by the metaphor of the cyborg and the claims of techno-affinityplaces itself outside history. Although cyberfeminists have been quick to claim any activity by women online (excluding, obviously, pornography websites) delineating some of the different ways in which the web is used enables a more subtle understanding of the interactions between gender and technology. Firstly, there are those IRL ('in real life') off-line women's groups which use the web as an organisational tool for larger activities off-line in order 'to gain publicity, to solicit donations, to serve as an education resource, to create organizational networks' .
7 Secondly, there are those who consider that web activity itself constitutes feminist activism. Amy Richards and Marianne Schnall, for instance, equate cyberfeminism solely with networking and activism: '[t]he Internet's international scope means it can help women feel part of a global sisterhood' (par. 8).
8 Cybergrrls and webgrrls build cyberfeminist websites for the purpose of 'informing, inspiring and celebrating women' (cybergrrl.com) and claim to manipulate technology in order to resist patriarchal subject positions. Carla Sinclair defines a grrl site as 'created by a woman who addresses issues without acting like women are victims. Grrrls take responsibility for themselves -we don't blame men for anything, but instead focus on ways to improve and strengthen ourselves. Grrrls enjoy their femininity and kick ass at the same time' (qtd. in DeLoach par. 1).
9
This is revealing about the gender fantasies of which thinking about the Internet permits rather than the Internet itself -drawing simultaneously upon Riot Grrrl and girlie ideologies. That is, thought about the Internet is mediated through various technologically inspired gender fantasies, something which Sinclair picks up in her power-feminist claim that grrl sites are for those who engage in grrl-power 'without acting like women are victims.' Cyberfeminism has also been claimed by online women artists. subRosa is a 'reproducible cell of cultural researchers committed to combining art, activism, and politics to explore and critique the effects of the intersections of the new information and biotechnologies on women's bodies, lives and works.' Similarly Karen Keifer-Boyd's The Cyberfeminist House is a web-based art game intended to teach 'how to investigate the complex ways that power, oppression, and resistance work in our media-saturated visual culture.' This is not to disparage these forms of cyber-interaction and cyber-activism, but rather to question whether these very disparate activities are -or should be -labelled cyberfeminism. The great promise of the Internet has been that it would dissolve gender and sex boundaries, allowing for a free mingling of minds. There are three versions of this promise: (1) the consumer relationship has reduced the relevance of the demographic complication of sex; (2) we regard any form of technology as eliding sex; and (3) with the repudiation of the 'body' in cyberspace, the phenomenological equation of 'body equals woman' is erased. This thesis goes untested and masquerades as demonstrative 'new' sex by virtue of the kinds of thinking that feed into it. Let me not, to the meaningless exacerbation of utopian conceptions of information technology, any impediment admit: 'Neither male (physically) nor female (genetically) nor their simple reversal, but something else: a virtual sex floating in an elliptical orbit around the planet of gender that is left behind' (Kroker and Kroker 18) . Why are we so keen to believe that the Internet appears to provide a space in which feminist politics and praxis can take place outside the patriarchal hegemony? Empirical studies have demonstrated that although the potential for gender-fucking whilst online is tempting, it remains largely science fiction. What is more important is that the Internet is constructed ideologically as a promise that the dissolution of the sexed body is imminent. However, although sexed and gendered characteristics can be re-coded at the press of a button, embodied patterns of behaviour resist any revolutionary change, as I have argued elsewhere with reference to the body in cybersex. The Internet does question the Enlightenment notion of self -as a gendered, raced and psychically sound individual -particularly in the way a subject relates to writing. But the cyber-body retains, for example, characteristics of gender and race because both are a social configuration. The body circulating through cyberspace does not obviate the body at the keyboard. The conditions for the cyber-dissolution of the body remain the gendered and racial body, so although the Internet raises questions about the Enlightenment notion of self by silencing once again the very question of embodiment, it also reifies the paradigms that endorse this selfhood.
Sex/Gender
Moreover, gender online operates in many of the same ways that it operates off-line. Kira Hall's empirical research on social interaction online indicates that the post-gender world of the cyborg is certainly not to be found in cyberspace. She notes that 'rather than neutralizing gender, the electronic medium encourages its intensification. In the absence of the physical, network users exaggerate societal notions of femininity and masculinity in an attempt to gender themselves' (167).
10 Susan Herring's work supports this, identifying two types of online posting: adversarial flaming which is used largely by men (e.g. a superior stance, posting long/frequent messages and participating disproportionately) and attenuated and supportive style used largely by women: '[w]omen's messages . . . tend to be aligned and supportive in orientation, while men's messages to oppose and criticize others' (115).
11 This is not to argue that technology is necessarily masculinised as Nina Wakeford's work on gender dynamics in an Internet café has usefully drawn the distinction between gendered on-and off-line behaviour of computer users. One need only to look to the history of the other communications revolution of the twentieth century -the telephone -for a historical example of this. A radical impact of the telephone was its exponential increase in the identification of the domestic as a locus of consumption. Ideas of predominantly female users, operators and female-coded technology expressed a fantasy of sex evolution that distracted from the degree to which the telephone supplemented existing economic arrangements and the notions of sexed embodiment that expressed and bolstered them . Cyberfeminism repeats this model in making the naïve assumption that gender politics do not exist online and that the sexed embodiments materialised by gender are suspended.
Indeed, the relationship of gender and technology has a long history, as Andreas Huyssen noted when he argued that '[a]s soon as the machine came to be perceived as a demonic, inexplicable threat and as the harbinger of chaos and destruction . . . writers began to imagine the Maschinenmensch as woman . . . Woman, nature, machine had become a mesh of signification which all had one thing in common: otherness' (70). The machine is coded as feminine because technology has been demonised as other; technology is othered because it is feminised, particularly information technology. In the desire to embrace and endorse cyberspace as a new and free space for all women, cyberfeminism denies the long history of technology and gender. Braidotti reminds us that gender boundaries and gender difference become exaggerated in both cyberpunk and the cyborg film genre: on the one hand an eroticized fetishization of the technological has pervaded through the imaginary of our societies, on the other hand, the technological is not associated with any sex, let alone the feminine, but rather with a transsexual or sexually undecided position. It coincides with a sort of flight from the body. . . . In such a context, the female body is constructed as the site of the natural, of bios and zoe, hence also of procreation. (233) Even a cursory examination of the cyberpunk novels and films of the past twenty years -from William Gibson's Neuromancer (1984) to Andy and Larry Wachowski's The Matrix Trilogy (1999 Trilogy ( -2003 -demonstrates that they explicitly draw upon the film noir tradition, speaking the language of hardboiled masculinity.
12 This can be dismissed as merely the masculine relationship with the machine 'which seems to bring out the worst in some men. It's been there with cars (the biggest, the brightest, latest, fastest) and it's there with computers as well' (Spender 183) . But rather than enabling the argument that men have an unalterable relationship with technology, those working in the field of gender and technology -which could include cyberfeminism if it engaged a political agenda and developed a technologically materialist approach to history -should seek to understand the why and the how of this relationship.
If masculinity is the predominant model of behaviour online, it must also be emphasised that this is a white masculinity. That fewer than 20 per cent of global households have electricity -let alone Internet access -raises the question of whose politics this fantasy obscures and permits. Braidotti points out that gender, age and ethnicity act as major axes 'of negative differentiation' in access and participation in the new high-tech digital world (176). Indeed, the question of whose cyberspace this is shifts the focus away from gender, something which cyberfeminists have been reluctant to do. While the Internet is used by both men and women, it is predominantly a white and Western activity. Beth E. Kolko et al. argue that just as 'first and second-wave feminists often failed to include race and the issue of Third World women in their politics, so too have many cyberfeminists elided the topic of race in cyberspace' (8).
13 Third wave feminists have noted that the politics of this wave of feminism emerged from the work of those who were excluded by the rhetoric of second wave feminism:
[t]he term feminism is itself questioned by many Thrid World women. Feminist movements have been challenged on the grounds of cultural imperialism, and of shortsightedness in defining the meaning of gender in terms of middle-class, white experiences, and in terms of internal racism, classicism, and homophobia. (Mohanty 7; emphasis in original) Such third wave feminists as Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake acknowledge that third wave feminism looks to US Third World feminism for 'languages and images that account for multiplicity and difference, that negotiate contradiction in affirmative ways, and that give voice to a politics of hybridity and coalition' (9). But third wave feminism (in its academic incarnation at least) is still very white just as cyberfeminism still feeds on a sci-fi aestheticisation of whiteness.
Dianne Currier points towards Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's model of assemblage as a 'diagnostic tool with which to begin mapping how assembled bodies and technologies and social spaces and practices intersect with systems of knowledge and power ' (535) . This model of assemblage could help us to understand the category of woman as understood within the technological and the social: 'we must understand cyberspace as not simply a technologically generated space or place, but as a series of assemblage comprised of elements of the technical, social, discursive, material, and immaterial' (536). The assemblage model is a useful way of thinking outside the confines of the cyborg/goddess metaphor which has dogged cyberfeminism. Ethnographic research on the discourses of the technological, social, material and immaterial may allow cyberfeminism to claim a place in feminist theory as well as history. Klein gestures towards this when she asks 'what is happening to women's bodies/minds/souls in real and cyberlife -is technology serving women -or are we serving it?' (187) Deborah Wheeler's work on how the intersection of women and the Internet is used in Kuwait, Wakeford's work on the cultures of the Internet café and Justine Cassell and Henry Jenkins' collection on gender and computer games are a few examples of the research on gender and technology that avoid the seduction of the cyborg and cyber-goddess metaphors in cyberfeminism.
Deifying/Reifying
At the core of the problem with cyberfeminism are the following questions: Is a feminist in cyberspace a cyberfeminist? And, more to the point, if you are a woman in cyberspace, are you a cyberfeminist?
14 These parameters exclude men from the (cyber)feminist project and obscure the potential for explorations of gender and technology, rather than women and technology. Cybercultural theorists and feminists need to reclaim materialist territory from cyberfeminists, moving away from the utopic.
Adam's call for a cyberfeminist ethics goes some way to demanding that this feminism -like third wave feminism -be accountable for itself. At the same time, we should bear in mind her point that cyberspace is deeply conservative, resting on a 'technological determinism which is uncritical of technological advances, which accepts as inevitable that technology will be used in a particular way' ('What Should We Do' 20) . While cyberfeminism appeared to offer a get-out clause in the gender debates of the 1980s and 1990s, it merely reified sex and gender in ways that are all too familiar. Cyberfeminism was quick to claim a polemical stance which is not reflected in its activities. By extension, it damages the potential political nature of third wave feminism. These 'new' feminisms -cyberfeminism and third wave feminism -need to more carefully interrogate their politics and their histories. For cyberfeminism, this entails disentangling cyborg feminism, gender and technology studies, cybercultural theory and e-activism. Only then can cyberfeminism re-assemble itself, both politically and historically. Haraway's polemic ends with the oft-quoted lines 'I'd rather be a cyborg than a goddess' but the permutations of cyberfeminism have not seen this through. Cyberfeminism, to date, has been neither cyborgic nor deifying -merely reifying. Radical cyberfeminism manifests in women-only strategies: 'Cyberfeminist practice has already adopted many of the strategies of the avant-garde feminist movements, including strategic separatism (women-only lists, self-help groups, chat groups, networks, and woman-to-woman technological training)' (Fernandez and Wilding 20) . 4. VNS Matrix is a group of artists who posted their 'Cyberfeminism Manifesto' on a Sydney billboard in 1991. They were among the first to claim the term 'cyberfeminist.' 5. Barbara Kennedy associates cyberfeminism with postfeminism because both question identity: 'Post-feminism seeks to rethink the feminist voices of the 1990s, to present a situational ethics, where we need to move beyond debates of binary thinking in which gender is perceived as immutably masculine or feminine: we should be concerned to go beyond established notions of gendered identity or subjectivity' (283). 6. For more on the damaging impact of this see Stacy Gillis and Rebecca Munford: 'the trouble with [the wave] model is that generations are set up in competition with one another and definitions of feminism are positioned around the "leaders" of these generations, whether it be the Pankhursts, Gloria Steinem or Germaine Greer. Current feminist figures are compared incessantly (and unfavourably) with these past "leaders" ' (176). 7. Appendix 2 of Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards' Manifesta attests to the organisational power of the Internet when used as a method of communication and information-sharing (339-381). 8. An example of e-activism is feminist.com which is 'a space for feminists -men and women -to strategize about problems and create solutions; share information and build a lasting community.' 9. See Laura Handy's 'CyberFeminism. virtual. activism. real. change' for an example of cybergrrl activism: 'Using the Internet for feminist activism empowers women to use technology while working towards feminist social change. It is CyberFeminism. . . . Be empowered -be a CyberFeminist!' 10. Hall's research was conducted largely on electronic bulletin boards as email was not prevalent in 1996. 11. See Tove Håpnes and Bente Rasmussen for a discussion of the relationship between hacker culture and masculinity. 12. See Flanagan and Booth for a counter to this; their collection brings together feminist science fiction and cyberpunk with cybertheory. 13. In MUDs (Multi-User Domains) you can construct categories for age, gender, timezone, and so on, but not race (Kolko 216) . Similarly, Blair and Takayoshu note that grrl-avatars 'raise the question of who can be a cybergrrl, in their construction of WebGrrl and CyberGrrl as thin, white women with long, flowing, brown hair and white faces' (17; footnote 2). 14. For example, consider the difference between those women who work with technology, and the cyberfeminist artist -the woman working on a factory line building microchips and the subRosa cyberfeminist artists are separated by more than geography and dial-up procedures.
